Mexico.3 Private consumptionin Mexico increasedat an average real annual rate of 5. 8% during 1989 -92,at 4.3% in Chile between 1978 , and at 11 % in Israel between 1985and 1987 Figures 1,2, and 3 show the increase in real per capita private consumptionin each country. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Consumption booms followingstabilizationshave also been obsemed in and in Ireland in 1987by Giavazziand Pagano (1990) . The Danishexperienceda of 3.7VC and an investmentboom of 12.770during
consumptiong~w at an averagerate of 3.6~c,and Denmark in 1982 consumptionboom 1983 .In Ireland,during 1987 -1989 investmentat 6.7Y0.
Several explanationshave been proposed in the literaturefor the mechanismthrough which stabilizationpolicies could generateconsumptionbooms. The most prominentof these is the idea .
introducedby Calvo (1986) that a lack of credibilityin the pmgm inducesthe public to inc~ase current consumptionrelativeto future consumptionbecausetoday'seffectiveprice is lower than the post collapse price. Anotheridea is that the fall in the inflationrate at the beginningof the pmgm generatesa wealth effect becausethe value of governmentbonds(whichare part of private wealth)
increases.@mno ( 1992) ).J This increase in the value of private generates a consumption boom. The thid explanation, which is wealth increases the focus of this expenditureand paper, is that following a stabilization,credit from the banking system to the privatesector increases reducing liquidityconstraints in the economy. A reductionin liquidityconstraintscan generatea consumption boom through a decline in excess savingsor lumpy purcha..esof consumerdurables. The effects all three of these explanationsare more pronouncedon consumerdurablesthan on nondurable.
In this paper, I concentrateon two aspects of the role of credit in post-stabilization consumptionbooms. First, I show that there is a significantdrop in the share of householdsthat of are liquidity constrainedafter the stabilization. Previous studies (Rossi(l988) ) have shown that liquidity constraintsare very importantin explainingthe excess sensitivityof consumptionin LDC'S. Deaton Chile, but the fall is not significantin Israel.
4 For this to hold. Ricardian rim-neutrality is required 4 A fall in the proportion of consumers who are liquidityconstrainedcan generate a consumptionboom in two ways. One is through a reduction in the excess savings accumulatedby these households. A second is through the increase in purchases of consumer durables. All the householdsthat prior to the stabilizationwere Liquidityconstrainedand could not buythedurables they wanted cando sowhen they are no longer constrained. This generates abunching ofpurchases of consumer durables and ajump in total consumptionexpenditures.s
In the second part of the paper, Ilookat the three main exogenouscharnels through which banking sector credit expandedafter the stabilizationsand fuel the consumptionbooms by reducing
Liquidityconstraints. Prior to the stabilizations,the combinationof asmall (and mostly) inefficient banking system and ahigh inflationenvironmentreflected very low levels of bank creditto the private sector. particularly consumptioncredit. The drastic fall in the inflationrates after the stabilizations combined with progressive financialreforms worked to increase the resources availableto the banking sector to finance private consumption. The ratio of banking credit to total private consumptionwent from 29.8 percent in 1978t098.4 percent in 1982 in Chile. In Mexico, the ratio of consumer credit to total private consumptionwent from 2.9 percent in 1987to 10 percent in 1992. and in Israel the ratio of unlinked bank credit to total private consumptionwent from 15% in 1985to 30% in 1988.67
The results highlightthe difference between the financialsectors in Mexico and Chile on the one hand. and Israel on the other. In Mexico all three channels for the increase in creditto consumers are very important;that is the remonetizationof the economy, the fall in the ratio ofdebt held by banks toGDP, and the increase in foreign liabilitiesheld by banks. For Chile, the most importantchannel is the remonetizationof the economy, while for Israel it is the fall in the ratio of public sector debt heldby banks toGDP. Israel's highly indexed financialsector and its high private 5Hayashi (1982) makesa simitar argument.
61nIsrael, unlinked Bank credit is the source of most consumer loans.
7 De Long and Summers (1987) also credit the increased availability of consumer loans with the reduced variability of aggregate demand and the fall in liquidity constraints in the postwar U.S.
. explain why there was not a significantincreasein the volumeof financial intermediationafter the stabilization,while for Mexico and Chile this was a ve~importantfactor.
The rest of the paper is structuredas follows. Section 11Elates the main featuresof the stabilizationprogms and the evolutionof credit and consumptionthereafter. Section 111 presentsthe permanentincome hypothesis(PIH) and sets out an alternativeal!owingfor liquidityconstrained consumers. The empirical investigationis ctied out in Section IV and Section V concludes.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILE, MEXICO, AND ISRAEL
Before turning to the estimationresults, we take a brief look at the histo~of the three stabilizationepisodes.
II. 1 CHILE
Following the coup of 1973,the governmentof Pinochetembarkedon a programthat would drasticallychange the Chilean economy. Between 1973and 1975,the governmentstarted añ gmssive progm to correct the most importantdistortionsof the previous regime. During this period.a gradualanti-inflationarypolicy was implementedwithout much success. In April of 1975, the first serious attempt to lower inflationwas madeby an orthodoxprogm of tight money growth.
B}I1978.however, it had become clear that the pmgrarnwas not working and with inflationstill runningat 37VC a year the governmentchangedcourse and started targeting the exchangerate.
In 1979,the governmentintroduceda new stabilizationplan by fixing the exchangerate at 39 pesos per dollar. The program worked well for a while and inflationfell to IOYoby 1981;however,the exchangerate became progressivelyovervalued. By late 1981it becameapparentthat the Chilean "miracle"was coming to an end. The fourth quarterof 1981was characterimdby extraordinarilyhigh real interest rates, a huge current accountdeficit, rising unemployment,and a fall in Ral GDP.
(Dombusch (1993)). The progm collapsedin early 1982and a severe financialcrisis developed.
During this time, Ra.1total privateconsumptionin Chile gmw at an average rate of 4.3% per year.
..
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As we will see later on, this consumptionboom was fueled by the increase in consumer credit which relaxed liquidityconstraints in the economy.
In addition to the goals of trade liberalizationand inflationreduction, the stabilizationplan also includedmeasures to liberalizefinancialmarkets and ease restrictionson credit. Edwards and Cox Edwards (1991) describe Chile's financialmarket during most of the 60's and 70's as a textbook case of financial repression. Credit markets were underdevelopedand highly distorted; the degree of financialintermediationwas extremely low, real interest rates were negative, and reserve requirements were extremely high at 100% in 1973and then 42% in 1979. Most importantly,credit was rationed and allocated using arbitrary and inefficientcriteria. Table 1 shows the ratio of M2 to GDP, real interest rates, and credit to the private sector. The numbers show a very striking increase in the volumeof financial intermediation, measured by the increase in M2/GDP ratio, after 1979. Prior to 1979, credit to the private sector small but increasing due to a combinationof the fall in the inflationrate and some reforms to the was capital markets. However. between 1977 and 1981the real volumeof total credit to the private sector increased by 264%! Another indicationof the decline in credit rationingcan also be seen in the percentage fall in the spread between the deposit and the lendingrate, and the increase in the credit to consumptionratio shown in Table2. This credit expansionled to a fall in liquidityconstraintswhich helped to fiel the consumptionboom during this period. Edwards and Cox Edwards (1991) point out that the rise in expenditure(consumptionand to a lesser extent investment)was largely financed through higher credit from the banking sector. This consumptionboom has been fueled by the extraordinaryincreasein the volumeof financialintermediationand mal consumercredit which has significantlyreducedthe proportionof the populationthat is liquidityconstrained.
Prior to 1988,the financialsectorof Mexico was severelyunderdevelopedand repressed.
Quantitativerestrictionsto credit we~widesp~ad, and interestrates wem highly~gulated. Between Table 5 does not include financing from non-banking financial intermediaries.
As these Tables clearly indicate, the growth in real credit has been spectacular, particularly credit for consumption.durable goods. and housing. Credit in 1991 and 1992. We will see in the next section how this to private individualsmore than doubled increase in credit led to a fall in liquidity constraints which fueled the consumptionboom.
11.3ISRAEL
Following the stock market collapseof 1983, a balance of paymentscrisis developedin increase in the inflationrate. in the real wage in the initial months of the program. (Bruno et al..(l99l) ). , The plan was extremely successful in reducingboth Inflation fell from 500% a year to approximately 16-20%per inflationand the budget deficit.
year over the next couple of years, and the governmentdeficit fell from an average of 15% of GNP in the previous decade to being balanced and even a slight surplus in 1986. The success of the program was reflected in a rapid consumption boom. Between 1986 and 1987 total private consumptiongrew at an average annual rate of over 11%. This boom eventuallydeflated in late 1988 as a recessionset in. Table 6 shows some main economic indicatorsfor this period. sector to Table 7. indexed.
The consumptionboom was partly fieled by the increase in real credit from the banking the private sector. Between 1985 and 1990the credit to consumptionratio doubled. See
However, unlike the Mexican or the Chileancase, Israel's financialsystem is highly
A very large proportion of the financialsystem are liquid assets, mainly foreign currency denominatedaccounts, which are linked to the exchangerate or the CPI. In addition, about half of the credit given to the private sector by banks is indexedcredit. The indexationof the financial system acts to protect depositors from inflationand devaluationrisk. This means that Israeli's were able to obtain credit prior to the stabilizationas well as after it. Table 8 . This reshufflingof the public's asset portfolio from foreign currency deposits (included in M3) to short term sheqel deposits (which are in M2) meant that in Israel there was not a marked increase in the volume of financial intermediationlike in Mexico or
Chile. Table 7 shows that the ratio of M3 to GNP remained relatively constant throughoutthe period. As we see, Israel is a case which is different from the other two countries. First, the consumptionboom was only short lived (between 1986and 1987)after which a recession ensued. See Table 6 . Second, the role of credit in this expansion is not as marked in the data since due to the indexednature of the financialsystem Israelis were able to keep their money at home and therefore were able to get loans prior to the stabilization. Finally, the process of liberalizingthe financialsector began very late and did not bear on the supply of consumer credit. The first minor changes were not done until 1987and more was done in 1990. These effects will become evident in the empirical results presented below.
Next, we set up the model of the PIH with an allowancefor liquidityconstrained consumers to see if the share of consumers which are liquidityconstrainedfalls in these countries followingthe stabilizations.
III. THE PERMANENT INCOME HYPOTHESIS AND LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
1n this section we present the permanent incomehypothesis(PIH) when we allow for the presence of liquidity constraints. This model will allow me to test whether liquidityconstraints actually fall after the stabilizations. If we assume r=6 and that U(C[) is quadratic,a then marginalutility is use the random walk result for consumptionwhich states that E,(C,+l)=C,. This
that marginalutility linear and we can says that consumptiontoday is the optimal forecast of consumptiontomorrow, which implies
. .
where &tis a rational forecast error and represents the news in permanent income. So, the change in consumptionis not forecastable; that is no informationin t-1 or before can help in predictingfuture consumptiongrowth.
In empirical tests of the PIH. however, Flavin (1981) and Hayashi (1982) 
A Cz, = ( 1 -k ) E, Using equation (4) the change in total per capita consumptioncan be written as Under this alternativehypothesis, the change in consumptionis a weightedaverage of the change in current income and the unforecastableinnovationin permanentincome. Equation(S) reduces to the Hall(1978) PIH when 1=0.
9For other studies were excess sensitivity has been found see Hansen and Singleton (1982) .
Consumption and the RA Interest Rate
The "random walk" hypothesisfor consumptiondepends on the assumptionthat the real interest rate is constant. However, the countries in our sample all experiencedlarge changes in the real interest rate. If we ignore this effect, variationof the real interest rate can make consumption appear excessively sensitive to income even though individualsintertemporallyoptimizewithout any borrowing constraints.~/
The generalizationof the consumer's Euler equationto allow for changes in the real interest rate (in log linear form) is u/ Aci = p * AAY,
where rl is the real interest rate contemporaneouswith AC~, and Etmay be correlated with r~,but is uncorrelated with lagged variables. The coefficiente=(l-~)a where csis the intertemporalelasticity of substitution. Equation (6) tells us that high ex ante real interest rates should be associated with rapid growth of consumption.
IV. LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS, CREDIT EXPANSIONS, AND STABILIZATIONS
1nthis section, we use the framework developedin the previous section to investigatethe effects of credit expansionsafter stabilizationson liquidityconstraints. First, I look at whether there was a reduction in liquidityconstraints after the stabilizations,then I examine if there is a positive correlation between increases in credit to the private sector and private consumption. Finally, I look at the channels through which credit expansionsoccurred in Mexico, Israel, and Chile.
/ See Christian (1987) on this point. U/ See. for example. Hansen and Singleton(1982) , and Hall(1988) . Note that in the process of log-linearizing the first-order condition. the variance of consumption growth has been included in the constant term. Hence, heteroskedasticity is one possible reason for rejection of the model; see Barsky( 1985) for a preliminary exploration of this issue.
IV.1 Stabilizations and Liquidity Constraints
Using the model set up in section III, we estimateL directly and test the hypothesisthat k=O against the alternativethat consumers are liquidityconstrained( 1 < L <0 ). This direct estimation of k has the advantageof providing a useful measure of the economicimportanceof deviationsfrom the theory. For example, if the estimateof A is close to zero then one can say that the PIH is approximatelytrue even if k is statisticallysignificant.
Since the error term may be correlated with AY,, we use instrumentalvariables, because least squares estimationof equation (6) can produce inconsistentestimates. Any lagged stationary variables are potentiallyvalid inst~ments since they are orthogonalto Et. The inst~ments used were selected because they help predict income growth. The instrumentsI used are a combinationof the following; lags two through four of each of the followingvariables, AC,, AY,, and the followingper capita variables real exports, real government expenditure,real governmentconsumption,real investment, real Ml, the terms of trade and a trend.u/ I estimatedequation(6) for Mexico, Chile, and Israel under the null hypothesisthat k remained constantduring the entire sample period. The alternativehypothesisis that k fell after the stabilizationprogram. The model is a log-linearapproximationto the true model in levels and differences since aggregatetime series on consumptionand incomeseem to be closer to log-linear than linear. That is, the mean change and the innovationvarianceboth grow with the level of the series.U/ Due to the fact that consumptionand incomeare measuredas quarterly averages rather than points in time, then measured consumptionis the time average of a random walk if the permanent income hypothesisholds in continuoustime. Therefore, the change in consumptionwill have a firstorder serial correlation of 0.25, which could lead us to reject the model even if it is true. Tõ / Several combinations of these instruments were tried for each country, the results did not vary much from the ones reported here.
B/ See Campbell and Deaton (1989) on this.
eliminatethis problem, the instrumentsI used are lagged more than one period, so there is at least a two-periodtime gap between the instrumentsand the variables in equation (6) M/ The ex-post real interest rate was calculated as r=[(l +i)/(l+n)]-l. Where i is the annualized deposit or lendi~g rate, and n is the annualized quarterly inflation rate.
H/ Hayashi(1982) "makes the point that a "measureof consumption which includes expenditures on durables is a more relevant measure of consumption for liquidity constrained consumers since they must use their saved income to purchase durables. / See Mankiw (1981) on this.
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The final equationestimatedfor eaeh country consisted of:
whe~D, is a dummy variableequal to Oprior to the stabilizationand 1 afterwards,DY~= AYt*Dt, and Dr, = PD,.
The dummy variablesare definedas follows. Table 9 shows the results. -1980.1 -1992.4 1975.1-1983.1 1980.1 -1992 The estimates for the proportion of the populationthat is liquidityconstrained clearly show a decrease after the stabilizations. For Mexico, the estimate is O.93 before the stabilizationand 0.15 after, with the drop significantat the 1% level. For Chile, the estimate is0.86 before, and O.16afier.
TSLS Estimates
Finally, for Israel the estimate is 0.88 before and 0.0 after at the 15% level. An F-test shows that the change in L for Mexico is significantat the 5% level, for Chile is significantat the 25% level, and for Israel it is significantat the significantat normal levels, this 5% level. Even though for both Chile and Israel the drop in L is not is partly due to the small number of data points before the stabilizationand in the case of Chile after the stabilizationas well. For Chile, when the sample is extended to 1989 the magnitudeof the coefficientsdo not change but the drop in 1 becomes significantat the 5 % level. Rows 8 and 9 present the first stage adjustedR2, which are high relative to those found by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) , indicatingthat the instrumentsused have significant power in predicting income growth and the interest rate. This impliesthat we can reject the permanent income hypothesisand the hypothesisthat L remained constantthroughoutthe sample with a fair bit of confidence.
The results of Table 9 show that liquidityconstraintsfell drasticallyafter the stabilizations.
in the next section we determine that this was brought about by an increase in credit from the banking sector.
IV.2 Consumption and Credit
If in fact the expansionof credit reduces liquidityconstraintsand can therefore be used as an explanationfor the consumptionbooms we observe, then the model presented in section III is an approximation. In particular, in a completemodel of consumptionwith borrowing constraintsthe fraction of consumers exhibitingexcess sensitivity(L) will depend on a variety of factors such as wealth, income, individualcharacteristics, and more importantly, on how well credit markets function,
Table 10 presents the sample correlations between total per capita private consumptionand credit to the private sector from the banking system. This correlationgives us an index by which to measure how consumptionand credit move together. The correlationbetween the two series is strongest for
Mexico, but for all three countries it is fairly strong. In order to get a better sense of how consumptionand credit are related, we present a scatterplotof per capita consumptionand per capita credit for each country. These correlations suggest that credit might be an important determinant of consumption if it Works to reduce the share of households that are liquidity constrained in the economy.E/ The reduction in liquidity constraints can generate the consumption booms we observe because it allows consumers who desire to consume more.
borrowing constraints, to increase their consumption and to reduce but could not due to their excess savings; allowing them to purchase the durables they have been waiting to buy.
IV.3 Sources of Credit Expansions After Stabilizations or by
The evidence presented in the previous section, shows that increases in credit after stabilizations play an important role in reducing credit constraints after these plans were enacted. In this section, I look at the exogenous sources of these credit expansions.
There are three possible channels through which credit can increase after a stabilization. These channels are evident when looking at the following accounting identity from a bank balance sheet.
private First, an increase in deposits given the level of public debt held by banks (and the level of reserves) increases the supply of loans to the private sector. The increase in deposits can come from the repatriation of capital held abroad as inflation stabilizes at lower levels and is reflected in the rapid remonetization of the economy as measured by an increase in M2/GDP.
The second channel through which credit availability can increase after a stabilization is through a decline in the level of public debt held by banks at any given level of the ratio of / If we assume that credit is exogenous. we can write~=~-~red, and plugging this into equation (6) we get AC,=p+~AY,-yAYt*cred,+ert+&,. This was estimated for all the three countries. and in each case y was negative and highly signilimt. The estimates were Y~C,K,,= -1.04, ych,l~= -1.4E-05.and Y,.,~,l= -9.3E-05, indicating that an increase in credit reduces liquidity constraints.
M2 to GDP. Resources from the financial sector which were previously being used to finance the government can now be used to finance the private sector. This crowding in effect of financial of credit a lower level of public debt occurs independently of the increase in the volume of intermediation.
Each of these channels in and of themselves, can explain the increase in availability to consumption following a stabilization. This implies that any (or both) of these reasons could be the key to explaining the decline in liquidity constraints that occurs after stabilizations. In effect, the level of credit in the economy is negatively related to the level of public debt held by the banking sector (scaled by GDP), and positively related to the degree of remonetization, measured by M2/GDP. With these effects in mind, we specify the share of the population that is liquidity constrained endogenously. (9) where M2/GDP is the ratio of M2 to GDP and B/GDP is the ratio of the real stock of internal public debt held by banks to GDP.u/ We expect yto be negative and~to be positive. Equation (9) says that as the economy gets remonetized credit increases so liquidity constraints decrease, and that as the level of debt increases the amount of credit decreases so 1 increases. Substituting equation (9) into (6) we get Table 1 I estimated equation (14) for Mexico 1. For Mexico and Chile, it is clear that the remonetization of the economy after the stabilization was a key element in the credit expansion (and therefore in the reduction in liquidity constraints) that ensued. As expected, we see that the estimate of Yis negative and significant at the 10YO level. On the other hand, this is not the case for Israel. 'I'his is not Surprising, since as we mentioned before, the financial system of Israel is very different from that of either Mexico or Chile.
Its highly indexed system acts to protect depositors from inflation and devaluation risk; therefore the level of banking resources available to the private sector did not change much from before the stabilization to after it. The steadying of the exchange rate and consequent sharp drop in devaluation expectations, the drop in inflation, and the rise in real interest rates on local currency accounts led to a drastic change in financial asset holdings, notably a shift from PATAM and other resident deposits to short-term sheqel deposits. In Israel, people kept the money at home but they kept it in accounts linked to the dollar, when the stabilization lowered inflation, people switched from dollars to domestic currency but the amount of resources in the banking system did not change much. This is reaffirmed by the evolution of the volume of financial intermediation as measured by M3/GNP shown in Table 7 .
/
The method of estimatim is always TSM with the same set of instruments as before.
TSLS
MEXICO CHILE ISRAEL Estimates.
- Looking at the results for the estimate of~we see that it is positive (as expected) in all cases, but it is only significant in Mexico and Israel. This implies that for Mexico the channels through which credit expansions occurred were both a remonetization of the economy and the fall in public debt held by the The crowding in effects from a fall in banking sector.
public debt held by the banking system are ulso quite important in Israel. This is logical since one of the principal objectives of the stabilization plan was to drastically reduce the deficit to GDP ratio. Even though this was the case in Chile as well, the data for Chile are very bad and some of the missing years were interpolated from the existing series.~/ In addition to the two channels through which credit expansions can take place already mentioned, there is a third factor. Banks can issue liabilities abroad and use these 27/ I tied~nm.]inear swcification for L in order to ensure that it is always between O and 1 since the linear specification has a the problem that L can become negative as M2/ GDP gets large. or larger than one as BIGDP gets too large. resources to increase the amount of loans to the private sector. In order to take this effect into account we respecified 1 as where FL are the real short-term foreign liabilities of the banking equation ( 11) into equation (6) where FLYt= FL/GDP * AY1. We expect y and p to be negative and 6 to be positive. The results are presented in Table 12 . The results show that only for Mexico does the increase in foreign liabilities by the banking sector make a difference in the increase in credit and consumption. It also makes the remonetization not as important (y is significant at the 2070 level). For Chile and Israel this channel does not seem to matter and as before the relevant channels are the remonetization and the fall in the public debt held by banks respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In looking at the role of credit in the post-stabilization consumption Mexico, Chile, and Israel, we find that the expansions in banking credit after booms of the stabilizations are indeed an important determinant of consumption. The paper shows that there is strong evidence against the PIH and that liquidity constraints were quite important in these countries prior to the stabilization. In addition, we see that the share of households that are liquidity constrained falls sharply after the stabilizations. This effect is strongest in the case of Mexico. The decline in liquidity constraints can generate a decline in excess savings and/or a lumping of expenditures on consumer durables which can help explain the consumption booms that we observe.
In looking at the sources of credit to consumers in these economies, I find that for the case of Mexico, all three of the sources examined played an important role. Credit to consumers expanded ratio of debt held by For Chile, I find that through the remonetization of the economy, through the decrease in the banks to GDP, and through the increase in foreign borrowing by banks. only the remonetization matters; and for Israel only the crowding in effect matters. These results highlight the difference in the financial markets of Mexico and Chile on the one hand, and Israel on the other. Israel's highly indexed and developed financial system mean that there was not a significant increase in the volume of financial intermediation after the stabilization since it was already fairly high. 
